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Abstract 
 
This study examined the effect of the economic system, capitalistic versus relatively 
socialistic, on ones willingness to punish altruistically. It is argued that because a relatively 
socialistic government takes away tasks and responsibilities, people in a capitalistic society 
should feel more powerful. As powerful people are less inhibited to act, we predicted that, 
they would be more willing to punish altruistically. To test this, a third party sanction 
paradigm was used. The experiment yielded no support for the hypothesis. However, people 
in the no government condition felt more powerful. So economic systems seem to have no 
effect on altruistic punishment. 
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Altruistic Punishment in Two Economic Systems 
When you see someone throw waste on the ground, what do you do? Do you speak up 
to them and say that they should throw it in a bin? Or do you let it go and let them pollute the 
environment? If everyone puts his waste in a bin, that’s better for society, as it reduces clean 
up costs, spares the environment and increases liveability. What could be an explanation for a 
person’s decision in such a case? We propose that the economic system people are in, —that 
is, relatively capitalistic or socialistic— influences one’s pro-social behaviour. The main idea 
that we propose is that being in a relatively socialistic system reduces the tendency of people 
to engage in pro-social behaviour. Taking away tasks and responsibilities from people, which 
we argue a relatively socialistic system does, decreases psychological empowerment. This in 
turn decreases people’s tendency to act—that is, it decreases their willingness to punish norm 
violators altruistically.  
Indeed, Fehr and Gächter (2002) found that people are willing to punish free riders 
even though that is costly to one self and yields no benefits for one self. They showed that 
altruistic punishing plays a major role in establishing human cooperation. We propose that 
people are more willing to engage in altruistic punishment when they perceive a system as 
more capitalistic compared to relatively socialistic. Given that the economic system, as it is 
ever pervasive, is such an essential part of society, finding this result would contribute greatly 
to our understanding of human cooperation. People need to work together in all sorts of 
situations and punishment can help achieve this goal (Fehr & Gächter, 2002). Providing a 
better understanding of how economic systems affect punishment can help stimulate 
cooperation and thus benefit society as a whole. 
Economic Systems 
An economic system could be defined as a “particular set of institutional arrangements 
and a coordinating mechanism for producing goods and services” (Brue, McConnel, & Flynn, 
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2010, p. 35). Two general types can be distinguished, the command system, also known as 
socialism or communism, and the market system, also known as capitalism. A socialistic or 
communistic system is characterized by a government that owns most of the property 
resources and makes almost all economic decisions. Nowadays only a few real socialistic 
societies remain. Almost all countries have adopted some form of capitalism. In such a system 
most resources are privately owned and markets are used to direct and coordinate economic 
decisions (Brue et al., 2010). So the major difference is that in relatively socialistic societies 
the individual has less freedom and responsibilities compared to capitalism (i.e., the 
government has taken over more responsibilities and tasks).    
For instance, in the Anglo-Saxon model (e.g., USA, Australia) social security should 
interrupt as little as possible with the free market, so the benefits are low and people are 
expected to have private insurances. The opposite of this Anglo-Saxon model is the Nordic 
model, which is used primarily in Scandinavia and Finland. This model sees social security as 
the pillar of society and, as such, the social security contributions and benefits are high. A 
high standard of living for all is the main goal. In between is the Continental model. Social 
security plays a big role in these societies, but it is more conditional than in the Nordic model 
(Einerhand, Kerkstraat, & Metz, 1995, as described in Goudswaard, De Kam, & Sterks, 2000). 
Thus, societies differ in how much control (i.e., power) they grant their citizens over their 
own lifes. Indeed, in relatively socialistic societies the government has taken over many tasks 
that were previously in people’s own control (e.g., health care). This decreased sense of 
power can negatively affect the extent to which people are willing to act. Indeed, empowering 
people can lead them to strive for desirable outcomes for both self and others. So people 
living in capitalistic systems could be more inclined to serve the common interest. 
Power  
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Taking away tasks, which the government does in a relatively socialistic system, 
makes people feel less in control of their lives and could therefore evoke a feeling of 
powerlessness in people. Seeing power as the ability to have control over one’s own outcomes, 
it is clear that in relatively socialistic countries the government has more power compared to 
capitalistic societies. Consequently, people living in capitalistic systems should feel more 
powerful than people living in relatively socialistic societies.  
The psychological state of feeling powerful is mostly associated with positive feelings, 
while lacking power is seen as an aversive state. People who feel powerless are more likely to 
experience negative moods and emotions. They pay more attention to punishments and threats 
and have more inhibited social behaviour. On the other hand, people who feel powerful have 
approach-related moods and emotions, process information more automatically and act more 
disinhibited (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). Three experiments by Galinsky, 
Gruenfeld, and Magee (2003) confirmed that experiencing power leads directly to taking 
action. For example, one of their experiments showed that people who where primed with 
power were more likely to act on a fan that was blowing annoyingly than people who were 
primed with powerlessness. Other research supports this finding (Anderson & Galinsky, 
2006; Smith & Bargh, 2008; Lammers, Stoker, & Stapel, 2010; Boksem, Smolders, & De 
Cremer, 2012). 
People who feel powerful are thus more inclined to act, but in which way? According 
to Hirsh, Galinsky, and Zhong (2011) power can lead to both pro-social and anti-social 
behaviour, but powerful people tend to choose the most salient option. This is consistent with 
the finding of Galinsky and colleagues (2003) that powerful people take more in a commons 
dilemma but also contribute more in a public good dilemma. Assuming that people living in 
capitalistic systems are more powerful than people living in (relatively) socialistic societies, 
comparable results are found in a field study. Ockenfels and Weimann (1999) found that East-
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Germans, who had lived in a socialistic system, contributed less in a public good game and 
showed less solidarity than West-Germans. Powerful and powerless people also differ in their 
way of moral thinking. Powerful people tend to focus more on rules and principles, whereas 
powerless people focus more on outcomes (Lammers & Stapel, 2010). Given the higher 
tendency of powerful people to act, this focus on rules could lead them to act in a 
corresponding way, which we argue is altruistic punishing people who don’t stick to the rules. 
Altruistic Punishment 
The fact that people engage in altruistic punishment, punishing non-cooperators even 
though it is costly to oneself and yields no benefits for oneself, is well established in the 
literature (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Boyd, Gintis, & Richerson, 2003; Fehr & Fischbacher, 
2004; Henrich et al. 2006). Punishment is one of the means to establish and maintain 
cooperation within a group. A simulation by Jaffe (2003) has shown that altruistic punishment 
is a strong driving force for the enforcement of social norms and very effective in changing 
the behaviour of a society. 
Altruistic punishments are mostly applied in social dilemmas. Social dilemmas can be 
defined as “situations in which short-term self-interest is at odds with longer-term collective 
interests” (Van Lange, Joireman, Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013, p. 125). It can relate to giving to 
or taking from a common pool. What the situations have in common is that non-cooperative 
behaviour is, at least in the short term, most advantageous to the individual but the collective 
is worse off than if everyone had cooperated. But punishing non-cooperators is a social 
dilemma itself. So why do some people punish altruistically and others do not? We argue 
powerful people do so because they think less about the situation and just feel they need to act. 
When they see a norm being violated and they have an opportunity do something about it, 
even though it is costly to them selves, they are less inhibited to use it. Therefore, to get back 
to our example from the first paragraph, seeing someone throw waste on the ground, would 
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make a person who feels powerful approach and correct him, although this could result in an 
awkward situation. 
If our prediction that there is more altruistic punishment and thus norm enforcement in 
capitalistic than (relatively) socialistic societies is true, we should observe a difference in 
norms. Ariely, Garcia-Rada, Hornuf, & Mann (2015) found that people with an East-German, 
socialistic, family background cheat more than people with a West-German, capitalistic, 
background. East-Germans were also more likely to say that cheating on tax can be justified 
compared to West-Germans (Torgler, 2003, as described in Ariely et al. 2015). According to 
our reasoning, these differences are due to feelings of power. Powerful people focus more on 
rules and are more inclined to act, therefore they engage more in altruistic punishment and 
thus norm enforcement. This would in turn lead to more pro-social behaviour in the whole 
society. 
The current research 
 We tested our hypothesis using a third party sanction paradigm (Fehr & Fischbacher, 
2004; Molenmaker, De Kwaadsteniet, & Van Dijk, 2014) in which participants observed the 
results of a six-person common resource dilemma. They were told this dilemma reflects 
society and that therefore, like in every society, a government exists which controls a certain 
amount of resources. Next they were given the possibility to sanction a person. The 
manipulation was the amount of coins controlled by the government. In the ‘capitalistic’ 
condition the government controlled less coins than in the ‘socialistic’ condition, while in the 
third condition there was no government. We predict, based on our reasoning, that 
participants in the capitalistic condition punish more than those in the socialistic condition. 
Method 
Participants 
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 147 participants (102 women and 45 men) participated with a mean age of 20.7 years 
(SD = 2.3). They received € 2,50 or 1 credit for participating and were assigned randomly to 
one of the three conditions. 
Design and procedure 
 After entering the laboratory, participants were seated in separate cubicles. Each 
cubicle contained a computer that was used to show instructions and record answers. The 
participants were told that they would perform a task together with six other, unknown, 
participants and that they could earn extra money on top of their participation fee depending 
on the choices made during the task. After completion of the study, a lottery would assign five 
participants who would actually receive the extra money. Next they were informed that one 
person would randomly be assigned the role of observer. All participants were told that they 
would be the observer. 
 Then the task, a common resource dilemma, was explained. This was presented to the 
participants as if it was a society that in two conditions had a government that controlled a 
certain amount of coins. In the ‘no government’ condition nothing was said about a 
government. The common pool consisted of 300 coins, each worth € 0.10. Each person then 
had the opportunity to take up to 50 coins out of the pool. The remaining coins would be 
multiplied by 2 and divided equally over the six participants, so it would be most beneficial if 
no one took money from the pool. To check whether the participants understood the task, they 
were questioned about some practical examples and subsequently shown the right answers.  
Now the task of the observer was explained. They were told that they would receive 
20 coins, each worth € 0.10, that they could assign to people participating in the task to 
deduct coins (the terms sanctioning or punishing were never used). Each assigned coin would 
result in a subtraction of 3 coins. They could keep the coins they didn’t assign. The 
manipulation was the amount of coins that was controlled by the government. In the 
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‘socialistic government’ condition the government controlled 250 coins while in the 
‘capitalistic government’ condition it only controlled 50 coins. Then they had to answer some 
questions to make sure they understood their role correctly and subsequently were shown the 
right answers. 
Then they had to wait for 2 minutes for the others to finish the task. Next they were 
shown the fictional results. There were 3 non-cooperators and 3 cooperators. The non-
cooperators took 30, 40 and 35 coins while the cooperators took 5, 0 and 10 coins. Now they 
had to indicate how many coins they wanted to assign and to whom. The amount of assigned 
coins would be used as measure of sanctioning.  
Lastly, the participants were asked to rate on 7-point Likert scales, ranging from 1 (not 
at all) to 7 (very much), how powerful (α = .87) and responsible (α =  .81) they felt. The 
positions were: ‘I feel powerful’; ‘I feel in control over others’; ‘I feel influential’ (power); ‘I 
feel responsible for regulating others’ behaviour’; ‘I feel responsible for others’; ‘I feel 
responsible for punishing others’ (responsibility). Then they were debriefed and paid.  
Results 
Before the analysis, the data from one participant were excluded because she assigned 
more than the maximum allowed amount of money (20). To test whether people in the 
‘socialistic government’ condition sanctioned less and felt less powerful than people in the 
‘capitalistic’ and ‘no government’ conditions, we performed an one-way ANOVA with 
condition as factor and sanction, power and responsibility as dependent variables. We found 
no significant effect for sanction (M = 8.08, SD = 7.60), F(2, 143) = .21, p = .81, so our 
hypothesis has to be rejected. Only a significant effect was found for power, F(2, 143) = 8.07, 
p < .001. To see which means differ, we conducted independent-sample t-tests. It appeared 
that people in the ‘no government’ condition (M = 4.28, SD = 1.21) felt significantly more 
powerful than people in the ‘socialistic government’ (M = 3.41, SD = 1.33), t(95) = -3.39, p 
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< .01, and the ‘capitalistic government’ (M = 3.31, SD = 1.39) condition, t(95) = -3.67, p 
< .001. Thus, it seems that the presence of a government makes people feel less powerful but 
its size has no influence, which is contrary to our prediction that people would feel more 
powerful in the small government condition compared to the big government condition. 
Table 1. Correlations between the scores on sanction, power and responsibility 
 Sanction Power Responsibility 
Sanction 1 .132 .31** 
Power  1 .37** 
Responsibility   1 
*p < .05, ** p < .01 
As shown in Table 1, we see that sanction and power only correlate significantly with 
responsibility and not with each other. So this means that there is, in contrast to our prediction, 
no relation between power and sanctioning. However, when we look at the correlations for 
each condition separately, it appears that in the ‘socialistic’ and ‘no government’ condition 
power and sanctioning do correlate significantly ( r = .29 and r = .30 respectively), but in the 
‘capitalistic’ condition not. This suggests there is a relation between power and sanctioning in 
these two conditions after all. 
Discussion 
In this study, we tried to find evidence for the hypothesis that people in capitalistic 
societies would engage more in altruistic punishment of non-cooperators than people living in 
relatively socialistic societies. Using a third-party sanctioning paradigm, no support for the 
hypothesis was found. This means that the presence of a governing system does not influence 
altruistic punishment. However, we did find that people in the ‘no government’ condition felt 
more powerful than people in the big and small government conditions. So people feel less 
powerful when a system controls part of the resources compared to when there is no such 
system, but the amount of resources controlled has no effect. 
Although no significant differences between the conditions were found, participants 
did punish altruistically. This is consistent with the literature (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Boyd et 
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al., 2003; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Henrich et al. 2006; Molenmaker et al., 2014). However, 
our design was different compared to previous studies. As far as we know, we were the first 
to use a third party sanction paradigm with a social dilemma containing more than two other 
persons. Thus, in bigger groups people also punish altruistically.    
So why didn’t we find the predicted effect on sanctioning? Keltner and colleagues’ 
(2003) review offers some explanations. The first could be the attention powerful people 
direct towards rewards. Because in our study the reward a participant got was partially 
dependent on whether he sanctioned or not, a focus on rewards would lead them to not punish 
or less. Secondly, powerless people pay more attention to the interests of others. This could in 
turn cause them to punish more, as they want to serve the interests of the people who took a 
fair share. Another reason could be that powerful people punish less because they feel less 
socially restrained. Powerful people don’t need to care as much about others opinions as the 
powerless and therefore can be more selfish. Those mechanisms might have countered the 
hypothesized effect. 
Our choice to use a common resource dilemma could also have affected the results. As 
Galinsky and colleagues (2003) have shown, powerful people take more in a commons 
dilemma but contribute more in a public good dilemma. Because of this, powerful people 
might not have perceived taking a lot as a big wrongdoing and consequently were less willing 
to punish altruistically. Using a public good dilemma instead might yield different results. 
Not finding an effect on sanctioning could also be due to our definition of power being 
different from the one used by Galinsky and colleagues (2003). Theirs was about the ability to 
control one’s own and others’ resources, while ours is about having control over one’s own 
outcomes. Giving people the opportunity to take away resources from someone else, thus, by 
definition makes them feel powerful. This could have nullified the effect of our manipulation, 
because it gave participants in all conditions a feeling of power. While we did find that people 
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in the no government condition felt significantly more powerful, this difference wasn’t 
enough to have an effect on sanctioning.  
One thing we didn’t take into account was the audience effect (Kurzban, DeScioli, & 
O’Brien, 2007). This effect entails that when other people, even only one, get to know the 
decision to punish, people punish more. As we wanted our experiment to resemble a society, 
we might better not have given them the opportunity to punish anonymously. After all, in real 
it is most of the times not possible to correct someone anonymously. It’s hard to say if this 
would have changed our findings, but it is something that should be taken into account in the 
future. 
 A future study might assess whether people who are primed with power, for example 
by writing about an experience in which they felt powerful (Galinsky et al., 2003), engage in 
more altruistic punishing than people primed with powerlessness. If such an experiment 
yields results, our hypothesis might be tested again, using a different manipulation. The way 
we tried to resemble a government was very subtle. But a government does not only control 
resources, it also takes away responsibilities. This aspect could be added to the paradigm. For 
example, by letting the government take a percentage, different in each condition, from the 
money participants took from the common pool, instead of having the government control 
resources. This is more like a real society in which the government takes over money and 
responsibilities simultaneously. When designing a future study this could be devised more.  
 We set out to investigate whether people in a capitalistic society engage in more 
altruistic punishment compared to people in a relatively socialistic society. No evidence for 
the hypothesis was found. In spite of this lack of results, we feel our line of reasoning is still 
promising. Future studies on the subject could learn from ours. 
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